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Nontechnical Summary
For policy-makers and non-specialist observers, interest in income convergence across countries lies in a simple question, Are the poor catching up with the rich? Concern over this is the same as that over the dynamics of income distributions and inequality across people and families within societies. Observers need not have a stake in a set of precise economic hypotheses in order to be interested in the answer to this question. The issues here are basic and fundamental, and cut across broad elds of economics.
Therefore, in empirical studies of macroeconomic growth, it would appear that researchers are doubly blessed. Convergence is of interest in two important w a ys: rst, in the sense just described, and second in its ability, according to some economists, to provide insight on whether growth is better characterized as exogenous or endogenous. Just as the social payos to understanding this are potentially large, so too the input in the number of empirical papers written.
The research reported below raises some simple theoretical warnings on reading too much i n to the link between convergence and the endogeneity of the growth process. Previous research on stochastic growth models had already shown that cross-country convergence can occur, even with increasing returns to scale in the aggregate production function. We strengthen that conclusion by showing that absent auxiliary, purely statistical and non-economic assumptions on cross-country interaction| assumptions up to now left only implicit|the notion of convergence cannot be sensibly addressed in a representative-economy model. Making explicit those assumptions, however, then calls into question some widelyaccepted empirical ndings. (We also provide a particularly simple, and we think insightful, extension and proof of a previous result on how convergence can occur in the presence of increasing returns.)
In our view the way out of these diculties is two-fold. On the theoretical end, the researcher needs to be explicit about the nature of cross-country interaction|whether that is through merchandise trade, exchange of ideas, communication, or coalition-formation into blocs. On the empirical end, we f a v or eschewing regression-based analyses, and going directly to explicit models of distribution dynamics. Clearly, this paper does not complete the program on either, but only points to their necessity.
To summarize then, the lesson we take from these theoretical manipulations is that the link is a tenuous one between convergence empirics and theoretical notions of exogenous and endogenous growth. We d o not, however, conclude that this means convergence empirics are uninteresting. Instead, for reasons given in the rst paragraph above, we think these empirics are revealing of much that is useful. These empirics call for a theoretical modelling that is explicit about the relations between individual cross-section units, and thus mesh well with recent theoretical work on social and economic interaction.
Introduction
Rightly or wrongly, many macroeconomists continue to associate economic convergence with a predictive success of exogenous growth models, and in particular, a success over endogenous growth structures. Drawing so stark a distinction between dierent growth models is no doubt a caricature, but it serves useful clarifying purposes. Perhaps most important, it suggests that evidence for convergence is evidence that ongoing growth is impossible|without some device such a s a d h o c , exogenously-specied (i.e., unmodeled) technical change. This is because convergence ought to mean that those economies that are ahead tend to slow d o wn; those behind tend to catch up.
In an interesting recent contribution Kelly (1992) has shown that convergence is consistent with a large and important class (Long and Plosser, 1983 ) of endogenous growth models that display ongoing, persistent growth. That work explicitly breaks the incorrect line of reasoning described in the previous paragraph. It shows that the empirical evidence on convergence does not have the implications that many had attributed to it. Taken to a natural extreme, that work might b e thought to cast doubt altogether on the informativeness of empirical studies of convergence.
In our view, such a conclusion is unwarranted. Empirical studies of convergence are informative because they address basic questions like, Are the rich getting richer and the poor, poorer? Are the poor catching up with the rich? Such issues have long been of concern to economists working in public nance and income distribution. These issues bear intellectual interest independent of the exact nature of technical change and economic growth. Research on growth and convergence empirics has shed new insight on these classical questions, and has moreover provided methodological payos for research in other areas. Tools for studying convergence empirics shed light on many dierent problems, including the evolving size distribution of rms in an industry; regional dynamics; and the dynamic behavior of wage disparities.
However, the analysis in Kelly (1992) does raise important new issues for inter-preting convergence in economic growth. The results there|on convergence and persistent growth simultaneously occurring|turn crucially on a clever stochastic specication of a work-horse endogenous growth model. Such a setup is ideal for further developing explicit testable implications. In this paper, we exploit the framework to do exactly that: We clarify how a large class of exogenous and endogenous growth models dier in their dynamic, aggregate behavior (answer: not that much); we i n terpret earlier, well-known convergence studies (lessons more subtle than often imagined, relying on implicit, unwarranted assumptions); and we draw some general lessons for subsequent studies on convergence and growth.
In the process, we also clarify the mechanism behind the convergence result in Kelly (1992) . The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets down the basic model, simplied to emphasize only the key issues. Section 3 discusses the model's empirical implications, and relates them to well-known published studies of growth and convergence. Section 4 presents again the convergence result from Kelly (1992) , only providing more intuition, and removing an ambiguity in the original argument. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
The basic model
We take the simplest model; this will suce to consider all the relevant issues. Assume, therefore, a growth model having only a single sector. This is as in the most stripped-down cases in Kelly (1992) , which in turn derive from the well-known model of Long and Plosser (1983) .
However, in contrast to the models in Kelly (1992) , we make explicit the dierent economies imagined in the model. For discussing convergence and cross-section dynamics, it is essential to clarify what happens when to dierent economies. Thus, consider economies indexed by j, e v olving mutually autonomously, and each 1 Quah, in a series of papers (Quah, 1993a{b, 1995 , has emphasized this in criticizing the usual \convergence hypothesis" tests. More on this below. (1 + ) t log C j (t); > 0 (1)
Subscripts denote an economy's label; parentheses enclose index in time. Assume that f ((t); ( t )) : integer t g is a jointly stationary vector process with all entries (a.s.) positive. At time t agents in every economy observe the same history
expectations conditioned on this history will be denoted E t = E ( j F ( t )), a notation already used in (1). T h us, by our timing assumption, E t (t) 6 = (t) and E t (t) 6 = (t) in general. Not allowing agents to see at time t the productivity disturbances (t) and (t) is not crucial for the discussion, but we follow Kelly (1992) in this.
2 Similarly, the specication follows Kelly (1992) in assuming full depreciation, although this could be relaxed using the analysis in Stokey and Lucas (1989, pp. 10-11) .
The important feature here|one whose implications will manifest in some of the discussion below|is that (;) i s i n v ariant i n j . Put another way, these disturbances are common across economies. While not emphasized in Kelly (1992) 2 For technical reasons, we might require (;) t o h a v e compact support, but such considerations won't be essential in the discussion to follow. Also, assuming (;) has rst-order Markov structure would t the problem more neatly into Stokey-Lucas (1989) notation, but again this won't be essential.
or the many empirical studies on these issues, convergence|in the way that these researchers intend|is impossible to discuss without being explicit about this.
The other feature to note is that \capital share" (t), while identical across economies, is not a constant, but instead permitted to be a nondegenerate stochastic process: the convergence results in Kelly (1992) rely critically on this. We write \capital share" in quotes for the simple reason that with externalities in accumulating K, the exponent will of course exceed capital's share of factor payments in a decentralized competitive equilibrium.
Finally, w e repeat that except for the commonality i n ( ;) the economies j are assumed to evolve autonomously of each other|allowing interaction, say due to factor mobility across economies, generates dynamics that dier from those under this autonomy assumption. At time t the planner chooses consumption and investment rules that are F(t)-measurable functions; thus, at time t, v alues for C j (t) and K j (t + 1) are determined and known. Assume that f (t) : i n teger t g is such that the value function for problem (1) is bounded (a.s.). Then optimal investment implies the capital stock:
so that from equation (2) output behaves as:
Similarly, again from (2) the capital stock e v olves as:
Taking logs and dening y j def = log Y j and k j def = log K j give the rst-order stochastic 3
The implications of such factor mobility are explored in, e.g., Barro et al (1995) and Lucas (1993) , and with an emphasis on empirics in Quah (1996a).
{ 5 { dierence equations: y j (t + 1) = log (t + 1 ) + ( t + 1) log(E t (t)) (t + 1) log(1 + ) + (t + 1 ) y j ( t ) = ( t + 1 ) + ( t + 1 ) y j ( t ) (4) and k j (t + 1) = log (t) + log(E t (t)) log(1
where we h a v e dened and thus:
(t) = log (t) + ( t ) log(E t 1 (t 1)) (t) log(1 + ) (t) = log (t) + log(E t (t)) log(1 + ): Note that and are both stationary and common across economies: these properties are immediate from the corresponding ones in (;).
The coecients on lagged y and k in equations (4) and (5) come directly from the technology assumption (2)|not the investment and consumption functions, given indirectly in (3). T h us, whether the planner optimally selects investment and consumption, or whether there are accumulation externalities as in Romer (1986) , the lag coecients in (4) and (5) are the same: it is only the equatioǹ residuals' and that change. 4 In this (standard) model, therefore, the dynamics of output and capital in a single or representative economy d o not distinguish ecient growth from inecient growth with externalities. Those dynamics are the same under both kinds of growth, and it is (roughly speaking) only levels that change. This message, while not central, carries over to tests of the convergence hypothesis that we discuss more below. 4 It is easy to see that if the decentralized competitive equilibrium ignores an aggregate capital externality, only equation (3) changes, with no impact on lagged y and k coecients in equations (4) and (5). 3. Some important special cases and convergence empirics To clarify the issues at stake, we consider in this section some important specializations of the model. The discussion focuses on empirical issues|as in, e.g., Bernard and Durlauf (1996), Canova and Marcet (1995) , Carlino and Mills (1993) , Friedman (1992) , and Quah (1993a{b, 1995 |rather than the theoretical convergence concerns in Kelly (1992) . We return to the latter in the next section.
First, take the standard case where (t) = for all t (a.s.). Then so that, up to a shift in mean, inherits all its stochastic properties directly from . Also, (4) becomes y j (t + 1 ) = y j (t) + ( t + 1 ) for t t 0 ;
(6) with y j (t 0 ) = log (t 0 ) + k j (t 0 ):
Iterating, we get y j (t) = t t 0 y j ( t 0 ) + t 1 t 0 X s =0 s (t s):
(7) If = 1 then y j for each j is an integrated (order 1) process. If, further, is iid through time, then equation (6) says that y j (for each j) is a random walk with drift E=Elog + log((1 + ) 1 ) that could be positive or negative. Most economists would take this case, (t) = = 1 , t o b e the quintessential case of no convergence, although as will become apparent, such a conclusion does not follow. For one, studying equation (6), if the drift E is negative, then y j diverges to 1 (a.s.) so that Y j converges to 0 (again, a.s.). In a dierent setting (discussed further below) it is exactly this device|that divergence in logs to 1 implies convergence in levels to 0|that gives the results in Kelly (1992) . But, here, this is trivial and uninteresting, and we can always assume Eto be nonnegative since it depends only on exogenously-determined parameters. Assume this then, { 7 { regardless of the value of . When < 1 standard time-series reasoning applied to equation (6) says that y j is eventually stationary (unless k j (t 0 ) had been chosen from the appropriate distribution whereupon y j is immediately stationary, without qualication). When = 1, under our assumption on E, then y j is an integrated order 1 sequence with nonnegative drift, and thus neither y j nor Y j converges. 5 We can now relate this to cross-section analyses of the convergence hypothesis (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and others). In equation (7) 
dening the function in the obvious way. But this is just the usual convergence equation. The left-hand side of (8) is an average growth rate; the right hand side shows the abeyant dependence on initial conditions through (t t 0 ) = ( t t 0 ) 1 ( t t 0 1):
O t t 0 = 0, the function (t t 0 ) is negative whenever is less than 1. Studies of cross-country convergence typically focus instead on , dened implicitly by:
More precisely, neither y j nor Y j converges in distribution to a well-dened random variable. { 8 { (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992) . Inverting this relation, we see that: = (t t 0 ) 1 log(1 + (t t 0 )(t t 0 )) = (t t 0 ) 1 log(1 + ( t t 0 1)) = log :
Thus, the rate of -convergence is positive precisely when is less than 1, is zero when equals 1, and varies negatively and monotonically in .
This claries the relation|implied by the standard model|between crosssection and time-series tests of convergence (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) , Bernard and Durlauf (1996) , Carlino and Mills (1993) ). Both kinds of tests examine the same coecient, but under dierent transformations. Where these cross-section and time-series tests dier, of course, is also clear. If is indeed common across all economies then no cross-section regression on equation (8) can hope to estimate either or consistently. T h us, researchers working under the assumption that productivity disturbances are common across economies must disbelieve the usual cross-country convergence ndings. If, however, in equation (6) (t + 1) turns out to be uncorrelated with y j (t) then a straightforward time-series regression|carried out separately for each economy j even|will consistently recover , regardless of the commonality o f across economies.
Writing the problem as above, it also becomes apparent that a convergence regression with = 0 is exactly the situation where = 1, i.e., the case of a unit root in a time series.
6
A large literature on this, beginning with the important work of Nelson and Plosser (1982) has developed, with its principal nding that = 1 is an approximation not lightly discarded. Why is the cross-section on convergence concluding the opposite taken to be so much more compelling?
It must be that researchers believe that cross-section evidence tells something about the behavior of poor and rich economies relative to each other|and not just about the univariate properties of output in a single economy. H o w ever, while 6 Quah (1996b) develops further this comparison between cross-section convergence regressions and unit root processes. recovering or equivalently says whether y j |taken by itself, independently of other economies|might or might not converge to a stationary distribution, it typically says nothing about whether incomes in dierent economies are converging towards each other! Why is this?
If is common across economies, then|as we h a v e already argued above| cross-section regressions are dicult to interpret. However, such a situation does happen to be one where knowledge of or is informative, for from equation (7), we h a v e lim t 0 1 y j (t) =lim t 0 1 jt 0 j y j (t 0 ) + 1 X s =1 s (t s); (9) and (assuming y j (t 0 ) bounded) the restriction < 1 implies that the rst term on the right hand side vanishes, whereas = 1 implies that it does not. The second term on the right of (9) does not depend on j, and thus is identical for all economies. Therefore, here, the value of |or equivalently even though it cannot be estimated from cross-section convergence regressions|does allow inferring whether rich and poor economies are converging towards each other. However, when has any hope of being consistently estimated by cross-section regressions| the 's are not perfectly correlated across j|the second term is no longer the same across economies, and 's value says nothing about the behavior of rich and poor economies relative to one another.
The results here relate to those of Bernard and Durlauf (1996) . Those authors show that cross-section regression tests can reject the null of no-convergence too often (when the data are generated by a specic new-growth model). At the 7 As a side issue of interest, note that in this case, = 0 o r = 1 does not imply growing inequality relative to the leading economy: instead, inequalities simply persist, neither growing nor shrinking. This thus provides a simple counterexample to the common claim (e.g., Parente and Prescott, 1993 ) that = 1 cannot be correct as cross-section dispersions of y in reality do not appear to be growing. More intricate examples with the same message can be easily constructed: just let be distributed with a strong common component across economies.
same time, they argue that time-series regression tests can be sensitive to initial conditions. Our nding, by contrast, is that under the assumption of interest| common, so that cross-country convergence is meaningfully related to < 1| the cross-section regression cannot even be consistently estimated, much less provide hypothesis tests. And, while our theoretical ndings suggest a preference for time-series regression analyses, we agree with Bernard and Durlauf (1996) on the incipient sensitivity to initial conditions. If we turn to when does vary across economies, then most natural is to assume that j is iid across j. I f < 1, then as t 1 , the cross-section distribution of y becomes identical to the invariant or steady-state distribution of any single one of the y j 's (by the Glivenko-Cantelli theorem). Further, that invariant distribution will typically be nondegenerate, so that what we mean by convergence of rich and poor economies is subtle. The situation is exactly that where a Galton's fallacy argument applies to interpreting cross-section convergence regressions|e.g., Friedman (1992), Quah (1993b) |and a nding of -convergence then does not mean the gap between rich and poor is falling. When the invariant cross-section distribution is nondegenerate, individual economies will, typically, still be transiting across dierent parts of the invariant distribution. There will therefore be time intervals when already rich economies are growing richer while already poor ones are growing poorer, even though there is \convergence" in the sense that < 1 o r > 0. Also, notice that when the invariant distribution is unique, then all initial distributions must converge to it, even initial distributions with dispersions smaller than the invariant one's (see, e.g., Fig. 1 in Quah, 1996b) . Put dierently, < 1 or equivalently > 0 is consistent with a cross-section distribution that shows, over short and medium runs, increasing dispersion between rich and poor.
To summarize, then, this reasoning has suggested that everything depends on what we assume about the 's. But these are exogenous disturbances: no economic reasoning in the model establishes their properties. Empirically studying (crosseconomy) convergence is thus delicate and subtle, even in models as explicit and simple as that here. Part of the diculty is that in the simplest, most common models used for analyzing economic growth, all cross-economy i n teraction occurs only through unmodelled exogenous disturbances. In that case, interpretable economic assumptions on technology and externalities place almost no restrictions on how rich and poor economies behave relative to one another. But it is the latter observations that drive theoretical research (e.g., as argued persuasively by Romer, 1994) . It is the behavior of the rich and poor relative to each other that are the high-stakes motivation in understanding economic growth. If one were interested only in representations like equation (6), then studying univariate time series representations (e.g., Carlino and Mills, 1993) might already be best. However, under conditions where cross-economy regressions might be sensible, estimates of and theoretical restrictions on or say almost nothing about the behavior of rich and poor economies relative to one another. We take a s t w o-fold the concrete implications thus far. First, consistently estimating or is not straightforward. Second, even if and were known, any implications for the poor catching up with the rich are unavailable except under overly restrictive auxiliary, non-economic assumptions. Moreover, in the standard model used here, those same assumptions would make impossible consistent estimation of the cross-section convergence regression. Therefore, to address empirical convergence issues, we prefer bypassing altogether these and parameters and the cross-section convergence regression. Instead, we w ould use the models of explicit distribution dynamics developed in Quah (1993a{b, 1995 . The empirical results there provide a richness of characterization in terms of polarization and stratication, that is unavailable in the standard regression framework.
8 Canova and Marcet (1995) and den Haan (1995) have i n v estigated alternative specications for the stochastic disturbances than we h a v e done here. They too have emphasized the diculty i n i n terpreting the empirical ndings from standard regression analyses. And, for understanding the theoretical signicance of convergence, they too have emphasized the overly important role played by arbitrary, exogenous specication of the stochastic structure.
Convergence properties
Return now to the model that Kelly (1992) used to argue for convergence with stochastic, endogenous growth. The convergence problem studied here is univariate: what happens in the economy under consideration? 9 Iterate equation (4), the general version of equation (6) (10) this is just the analogue of equation (7).
Equation (10) makes transparent the convergence result in Kelly (1992) . Since is common, cross-economy dierences manifest only through the rst summand on the right hand side of (10). But notice that if (t) is strictly positive, with Var((t)) > 0, and E(t) = 1, then the product limit in this rst summand behaves as 
so that all economies do converge towards each other, even with \stochastic constant returns to scale" E(t) = 1 or \stochastic increasing returns" E(t)>1. Why is (11) correct? It follows, of course, from the argument in Proposition 1 of Kelly (1992)|except we will see that (11) remains true even when is not serially independent. (The statements in Kelly (1992) are only for iid , s o w e obtain here a trivial improvement on those results.) We repeat the argument s o 9 As argued above, this discussion can be extended to convergence between pairs or within groups of countries only with implicit assumptions that neither are economically motivated nor play a crucial role in the economics of the problem. Nevertheless, we feel that the univariate convergence issue remains an interesting scientic question, and so we complete the study here. 0 whereas the limit is 1 when Var((t)) vanishes? Take a simple two-point distribution on f1 ; 1 + g with equal probability i n 's stationary measure on each point. Positivity i n (a.s.) gives jj < 1; positive v ariance gives 6 = 0. In the stationary distribution, there are approximately equal numbers of occurrences in either value, 1 or 1 + . P air them up, and notice that (1 ) (1 + ) equals 1 2 which i s strictly between 0 and 1. Now m ultiply many such pairs, and the product goes to 0. When Var((t)) = 0 in this example, we h a v e = 0 a s w ell, and the product pairs (1 ) (1 + ) then always just equal 1, and the limiting product remains there. { 1 4 {
Conclusion
This note has done two things. First, in Section 3, we h a v e exploited the structure of stochastic growth models (Kelly, 1992; Long and Plosser, 1983) to clarify why usual characterizations of convergence can be misleading: key parameters are typically not identied, but even when they are known, implications for convergence are unavailable except under restrictive and economically unmotivated assumptions. Moreover, in the standard model we h a v e used for the discussion in Section 3, the same assumptions that relate cross-section convergence meaningfully to the key parameters render those parameters impossible to estimate consistently. Second, in Section 4, we h a v e provided an alternative and easy way to understand the theoretical convergence ndings of Kelly (1992) .
The results in Kelly (1992) have provoked some of our thinking on the meaning of empirical ndings on convergence. What becomes clear is that to understand economic convergence or divergence what we need are results on the dynamics of the entire cross section of economies, not theorems on the dynamics of a \rep-resentative" economy. Interestingly, it is instead the last on which most of the empirical convergence literature has focused. 10 Then, extending that intuition to the behavior of the entire cross section typically takes place only under assumptions that have no economic ideas attached (e.g., either the commonality o r t h e independence of 's in Section 3).
There is a perverse circularity in trying to obtain convergence results for endogenous growth models. The initial motivation for those growth models, as articulated by Lucas (1988) and Romer (1986) was precisely to understand the large and persistent gap between poor and rich. If that gap weren't as large and 10 Quah (1996c) is a counter-example: there, the author studies the economic reasons underlying bloc-formation and polarization across the cross section of countries, and then relates the predictions of the model to empirical ndings. Ben-David (1994) is a comparable exercise, although using dierent motivations. Galor (1996) and Quah (1996d) link a range of theoretical ideas to these empirical issues.
